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1293 
“I [WON’T] FOLLOW YOU”: THE MISGUIDED, 
AND DANGEROUS, INTERPRETATION OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN 
UNITED STATES V. ALI 
Not only is United States citizenship a “high privilege,” it is a 
priceless treasure. For that citizenship is enriched beyond price by 
our goal of equal justice under law—equal justice not for citizens 
alone, but for all persons coming within the ambit of our power.
1
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent decades, the United States has dramatically changed the way 
it conducts military operations. Civilians in small numbers have long 
accompanied the armed forces to war.
2
 But civilian participation increased 
significantly in operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm
3
 and remained 
elevated during the contingency operations in Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and 
the former Yugoslavia.
4
 Civilians are now an essential constituent of our 
armed forces; as of 2007, the number of contractors in Iraq exceeded the 
number of troops.
5
 With 180,000 contractors working in Iraq—and a 
comparable number in Afghanistan—they inevitably will commit crimes.6 
In order to maintain good relations with the “host country” and discipline 
 
 
 2. OVERSEAS JURISDICTION ADVISORY COMM., REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, THE 
ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 12–13 (1997) [hereinafter OJAC 
REPORT]. The Overseas Jurisdiction Advisory Committee was appointed by Attorney General Janet 
Reno and Secretary of Defense William Perry. Id. at iv. The Report was requested from Congress in 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 1151, 110 Stat. 
186, 467–68 (1996). 
 3. OJAC REPORT, supra note 2, at 15–16. 
 4. Id. at 18. 
 5. Steven Paul Cullen, Out of Reach: Improving the System to Deter and Address Criminal Acts 
Committed by Contractor Employees Accompanying Armed Forces Overseas, 38 PUB. CONT. L.J. 509, 
511 (2009). In 2007, there were 180,000 contractors and 160,000 troops in Iraq. Id. It is unclear 
whether these figures include civilian employees of the Department of Defense, who may therefore be 
unaccounted for. As of September 2007, there were 30,418 civilian employees in foreign countries. 
Employment—September 2007, OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., www.fedscope.opm.gov (follow 
“Employment” link; click “September 2007” link; click “Agency: Department of Defense (DoD 
Aggregate)” link) (last visited Mar. 21, 2014). 
 6. See Cullen, supra note 5, at 514–17. The author, a lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army, cites 
numerous points of concern surrounding both security contractors and support contractors. Id. I am 
focusing here on support contractors, although there are numerous issues presented by security 
contractors. See, e.g., Mateo Taussig-Rubbo, Outsourcing Sacrifice: The Labor of Private Military 
Contractors, 21 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 101 (2009). The primary concerns regarding crimes committed 
by support contractors include “theft of government property or assault on government personnel.” 
Cullen, supra note 5, at 516. As of 2010, the Department of Defense reported that 116 cases had been 
referred to the Department of Justice for Prosecution under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
Act. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., MEJA STATISTICS 5 (2010). Of those cases, seventy were charged or 
pending as of June 10, 2010. Id. at 3. 
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within the armed forces, jurisdiction over those crimes must rest 
somewhere. 
The inevitability of criminal activity required a judicial solution.
7
 
During the 1990s, the Department of Defense had insufficient solutions for 
civilian disciplinary issues. Often the United States did not have Status of 
Forces Agreements (“SOFAs”) with the countries in which it was 
operating.
8
 In other instances, the SOFA did not cover civilians.
9
 This 
created a jurisdictional uncertainty that often left crimes unpunished—
particularly crimes occurring on-base, where host nations were often 
hesitant to prosecute.
10
 And because of the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”), it was not possible to 
subject civilians to courts martial.
11
 
In 1996, recognizing the substantial issues related to civilians 
accompanying the armed forces, Congress created a DOD and DOJ 
advisory committee to recommend possible solutions.
12
 On the advisory 
committee’s recommendation, Congress passed the Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (“MEJA”) in 2000, which granted 
jurisdiction to U.S. district courts over most contractors and DOD civilian 
employees accompanying the armed forces overseas.
13
 
But MEJA has a jurisdictional gap: it does not apply defendants who 
are citizens of or “ordinarily resident[s]” in the “host nation.”14 When 
MEJA was enacted, the UCMJ only allowed court-martial jurisdiction 
 
 
 7. OJAC REPORT, supra note 2, at 12–28 (discussing solutions to the problem of prosecuting 
civilians accompanying the armed forces overseas). 
 8. Id. at 27–28. The United States has, at times, had Status of Forces Agreements (“SOFAs”) 
with Afghanistan, ensuring that the U.S. would have criminal jurisdiction over its forces. See 
Agreement Regarding the Status of United States Military and Civilian Personnel of the U.S. 
Department of Defense Present in Afghanistan in Connection with Cooperative Efforts in Response to 
Terrorism, Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, Military Training and Exercises, and Other Activities, 
U.S.-Afg., May 28, 2003, State Dept. No. 03-67; see also Mark Landler & Michael R. Gordon, 
Meeting With Karzai, Obama Accelerates Transition of Security to Afghans, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 
2013, at A5. 
 9. OJAC Report, supra note 2, at 27–28. 
 10. Id. at 18–19. 
 11. See McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 287 (1960) (holding that 
civilian employees of the Department of Defense were not subject to court-martial jurisdiction when 
Congress had not declared war). 
 12. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 1151, 110 
Stat. 186, 467–68 (1996). 
 13. Pub. L. No. 106-523, 114 Stat. 2488 (2000) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261–67 (2006)). 
 14. See 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1)(C). “This limitation recognizes that the host nation has the 
predominant interest in exercising criminal jurisdiction over its citizens and other persons who make 
that country their home.” H.R. Rep. No. 106-778, at 21 (2000). 
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over civilians during times of war.
15
 In 2006, in recognition of this issue, 
Congress expanded court-martial jurisdiction to include those defendants 
excluded from MEJA.
16
 Yet very few defendants have been prosecuted in 
courts-martial under the expanded UCMJ jurisdiction.
17
 Recent cases have 
highlighted the ongoing constitutional issues related to the exercise of 
jurisdiction over non-citizen military contractors working overseas.
18
 
In United States v. Ali, an Iraqi–Canadian dual citizen was prosecuted 
in a court-martial, under the expanded UCMJ jurisdiction, for crimes 
arising out of an assault committed while accompanying the Army in 
Iraq.
19
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces ruled that the 
exercise of jurisdiction over Ali was acceptable.
20
 Ali also argued that 
trying him in a court-martial violated due process and his grand jury and 
jury rights. The court held that his constitutional claims were not 
cognizable because he did not have sufficient connections to the United 
States to qualify for any constitutional protections.
21
 According to the 
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, Ali was sufficiently connected to 
the U.S. that he could be subject to criminal prosecution. But the court 
also held that Ali was insufficiently connected to be accorded 
constitutional protections during that prosecution—he was in “limbo, 
worse than hell.”22 
 
 
 15. See 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2000). In 1960, the Supreme Court held that § 802(a)(11), which 
provided court martial jurisdiction for persons accompanying the armed forces anywhere, not just in 
areas of conflict, was unconstitutional. See McElroy, 361 U.S. 281; Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 
(1960); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960). Lower courts had construed 
§ 802(a)(10) narrowly, requiring that Congress actually have declared war. See United States v. 
Avarette, 19 U.S.C.M.A. 363, 41 C.M.R. 363, 365 (1970). 
 16. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2006). Previously, jurisdiction was limited to “[i]n time of war, 
persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field.” Id. Pub. L. No. 109-364 replaced 
the word “war” with “declared war or a contingency operation.” See id. 
 17. See Holding Criminals Accountable: Extending Criminal Jurisdiction for Government 
Contractors and Employees Abroad: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1–2 
(2011) (statement of Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United States) [hereinafter Breuer 
Statement]. 
 18. See United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256 (C.A.A.F. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2338 (2013); 
United States v. Brehm, 691 F.3d 547 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 808 (2012). The concept 
for this Note came from a post by Professor Steve Vladeck at the Lawfare blog. Steve Vladeck, 
Brehm: Fourth Circuit Creates Split in Contractor-Contacts Analysis, LAWFARE (Aug. 12, 2012, 7:00 
PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/08/brehm-fourth-circuit-creates-split-in-contractor-contacts-
analysis/. 
 19. Ali, 71 M.J. at 258. Iraq declined to prosecute Ali and Canada did not have jurisdiction over 
his crime. MEJA STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 4 n.1. 
 20. Ali, 71 M.J. at 259. 
 21. Id. at 268. 
 22. William Shakespeare, Comedy of Errors act 4, sc. 2, line 32. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss5/8
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United States v. Brehm
23
 presented a similar, factual scenario but had a 
strikingly different legal outcome. There, a South African citizen was 
prosecuted in federal district court, under the Military Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Act, for an assault committed while accompanying the Air 
Force in Afghanistan.
24
 Brehm pleaded guilty, while reserving the right to 
appeal the district court’s refusal to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction. He argued that he, his victim, and his crime did not have a 
sufficient causal nexus to the United States and, therefore, prosecuting him 
violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.25 On appeal, the 
Fourth Circuit held that his employment created a causal nexus such that 
the prosecution comported with due process, to which he was (apparently) 
entitled.
26
 
This Note will address whether employment by the United States, or a 
U.S. contractor, of “non-citizen, non-residents”27 creates a sufficient 
connection with the United States such that the employees must be 
accorded constitutional protections during criminal prosecutions.
28
 Part I 
 
 
 23. 691 F.3d 547. 
 24. Brehm, 691 F.3d at 549. 
 25. Id. at 549; see also Brief of the Appellant at 13–29, Brehm, 691 F.3d 547 (No. 11-4755) 
[hereinafter Brehm Brief]. In his brief, Brehm asserted that the court lacked jurisdiction based on 
either of two tests. Brehm Brief, supra, at 13–29. First was a “sufficient nexus” test from the Second 
and Ninth Circuits. Id. at 13 (citing United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 111 n.45 (2d Cir. 2003)); see 
also United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248–49 (9th Cir. 1990). The second test analogized to the 
minimum contacts jurisprudence from civil procedure. Brehm Brief, supra, at 22 (citing Asahi Metal 
Indus. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 112–13, 115 (1987); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 286 (1980); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)). 
 26. Brehm, 691 F.3d at 552–53. 
 27. Courts often use the phrase “non-resident aliens” to refer to persons of this status. Although it 
persists as a legal term of art, “alien” is widely regarded as de-humanizing. See, e.g., Kevin R. 
Johnson, “Aliens” and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 
28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 292 (1996) (“[L]egal terminology is important. Legal 
construction of the “alien” has facilitated the rationalization of severe treatment of noncitizens. . . . 
Although difficult choices must be made, we should make them honestly with a full realization that 
persons, not faceless, nonhuman, demon “aliens,” are affected in fundamental ways.”); see also 
Careen Shannon, Stop calling people “aliens,” SALON.COM (May 27, 2013, 4:00 PM), 
http://www.salon.com/2013/05/27/stop_calling_people_aliens/. As such, and in keeping with the tenor 
of my argument, I instead use “non-citizen, non-residents” (or “non-citizens,” where appropriate). 
[T]he terminological issue is not simply a word game. Alien terminology serves important 
legal and social functions. Alexander Bickel perhaps said it best in the context of analyzing 
citizenship: “It has always been easier, it always will be easier, to think of someone as a 
noncitizen than to decide he is a nonperson . . . .” In Stephanie Wildman’s words, “language 
veils the existence of systems of privilege.” Lucinda Finley put it differently though with the 
same flavor: “[l]anguage matters. Law matters. Legal Language Matters.” 
Johnson, supra, at 270 (footnotes omitted). 
 28. Ali, 71 M.J. at 268 (holding that non-citizen contractors are not to be accorded constitutional 
rights); contra Brehm, 691 F.3d at 552. A separate question is what connection the defendant must 
have to the United States in order for an exercise of personal jurisdiction to be permissible. See Brehm, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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of this Note will present the statutory background and give a brief history 
of the two main cases, Ali and Brehm. Part II will address the holding of 
the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces in Ali in light of Supreme 
Court and circuit court jurisprudence, including Brehm.
29
 Part III will 
discuss the potential effects should the majority decision in Ali persist or 
be applied beyond the narrow facts of that case, particularly examining 
possible applications by the other branches of government.
30
 Part III will 
also discuss the possible tests for determining whether constitutional 
protections should extend to a particular defendant, and why a uniform 
rule that constitutional rights apply to any prosecution, termed here the 
“any-exercise rule,” should be adopted.31 
I. JURISDICTION OVER MILITARY CONTRACTORS 
A. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act and United States v. 
Brehm 
Congress passed the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 
(“MEJA”) “to establish Federal jurisdiction over offenses committed 
outside the United States by persons employed by or accompanying the 
Armed Forces . . . and for other purposes.”32 Persons subject to the Act 
include anyone “employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside 
the United States.” The Act defines “employed by or accompanying” as “a 
civilian employee of the Department of Defense,” a Department of 
Defense contractor (including a subcontractor), or as an employee of a 
Department of Defense contractor (including a subcontractor).
33
 As of 
2011, the Department of Justice had obtained seven convictions under 
 
 
691 F.3d at 552. This was the primary issue in Brehm, and is discussed in Lea Brilmayer & Charles 
Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217 
(1992). This Note will also not discuss the constitutionality of the expanded UCMJ jurisdiction under 
§ 802(a)(1). See Ingrid L. Price, Note, Criminal Liability of Civilian Contractors in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, 49 STAN. J. INT’L L. 491 (2013). 
 29. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 
259 (1990); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
 30. See infra Part III.A. 
 31. See infra Part III.B. 
 32. Pub. L. No. 106-523, 114 Stat. 2488 (2000) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3261–67 (2006)). 
 33. 18 U.S.C. § 3267. As discussed supra text accompanying note 14, MEJA does not extend to 
citizens or persons “ordinarily resident[s]” of the host nation. 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1)(C). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss5/8
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MEJA.
34
 Of these, four were contractors and three were Department of 
Defense employees or their dependents.
35
 
United States v. Brehm was one prosecution under MEJA.
36
 Brehm, a 
South African national, was employed at Kandahar Airfield (“KAF”) in 
Afghanistan by DynCorp International LLC, a U.S. military contractor.
37
 
While working at KAF, Brehm instigated an altercation with a U.K. 
citizen who was employed by a U.K. contractor.
38
 The incident ended with 
Brehm stabbing and seriously wounding the other contractor.
39
 After a 
phone hearing by a magistrate judge, Brehm was flown to Alexandria, 
Virginia for prosecution.
40
 He pleaded guilty to assault resulting in serious 
bodily injury, reserving the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his 
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
41
 On appeal, the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Brehm’s connections to the United 
States were sufficient to sustain jurisdiction without violating his Fifth 
Amendment right to due process.
42
 
B. Filling the MEJA Gap: The 2006 Expansion of Court-Martial 
Jurisdiction 
Like Brehm, most civilian contractors are covered by MEJA.
43
 But 
MEJA does not cover contractors who are citizens or ordinarily residents 
of the country in which the operation is occurring.
44
 To fill this gap, 
Congress amended the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) in 
2006 to expand court-martial jurisdiction over persons “serving with or 
accompanying an armed force in the field” to include contingency 
operations in addition to wartime.
45
 There are numerous procedural 
 
 
 34. Breuer Statement, supra note 17, at 2–4. Since 2000, attempts have been made to expand 
MEJA jurisdiction to contractors working with civilian branches of government. See S. Rep. 112-193, 
at 191 (2012). The most recent attempt, the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, died in 
committee. See Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (CEJA) of 2011, S. 1145, 112th Cong. (2011), 
available at beta.congress.gov/112/bills/s1145/BILLS-112s1145is.pdf. 
 35. Breuer Statement, supra note 17, at 2–4. 
 36. United States v. Brehm, No. 1:11-CR-11, 2011 WL 1226088 (E.D. Va. Mar. 30, 2011). 
 37. United States v. Brehm, 691 F.3d 547, 549 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 550. 
 42. Id. at 552. 
 43. See 18 U.S.C. § 3267 (2006). 
 44. 18 U.S.C. § 3267(2)(C). 
 45. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, 
§ 552, 120 Stat. 2083 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2012)). 
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differences between courts-martial and civilian criminal trials.
46
 “A court-
martial accused has no Fifth Amendment grand jury right, no Sixth 
Amendment jury right, no right to a jury of at least six members, and no 
right to a unanimous guilty verdict.”47 Accused in courts-martial also have 
no automatic right to appeal, except in limited circumstances.
48
 
Ali was the first, and apparently only, prosecution under the expanded 
UCMJ jurisdiction.
49
 The underlying facts are strikingly similar to Brehm, 
but there are two important distinctions. First, Ali was a citizen of Canada 
and Iraq, and was working as a translator in Iraq.
50
 As such, he was 
working in one of his home countries.
51
 Second, Ali was prosecuted in a 
court-martial under the expanded UCMJ jurisdiction.
52
 During his defense, 
Ali raised constitutional defenses, including jurisdictional and procedural 
defenses.
53
 The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that Ali’s 
connections to the United States were insufficient to entitle him to 
constitutional protections.
54
 
 
 
 46. See John F. O’Connor, Contractors and Courts-Martial, 77 TENN. L. REV. 751, 751–52 
(2010) (discussing the limited procedural protections in courts-martial). 
 47. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V; Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2, 123 (1866); Ballew 
v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 245 (1978); Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817 (1999)). 
 48. Id. at 752. 
 49. The Department of Defense Report on MEJA prosecutions noted that Ali was the sole 
prosecution under the expanded § 802(a)(10). See MEJA STATISTICS, supra note 6, at 4. Additionally, 
searches for other cases citing to 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) on WestlawNext™, LexisNexis®, and 
BloombergLaw™ have yielded no other § 802(a)(10) prosecutions.  
 50. United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 259 (C.A.A.F. 2012). The procedural posture of Ali may 
seem odd to those unfamiliar with courts-martial. Because there is no automatic right of appeal for 
most prosecutions, appeals to the courts of criminal appeals for each branch must be forwarded by the 
Judge Advocate General for the respective branch. See United States v. Ali, 70 M.J. 514, 515 (A. Ct. 
Crim. App. 2011). Before the record from Ali’s trial was forwarded to the Judge Advocate General, he 
filed petitions for extraordinary relief in the Army Court of Criminal Appeals and Court of Appeals for 
the Armed Forces, both of which were denied. Id. 
 51. Ali, 71 M.J. at 259; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3267(2)(C) (2006). As was noted above, Ali’s 
nationality meant that he could not be prosecuted under MEJA. See supra text accompanying notes 
43–45. 
 52. Ali, 71 M.J. at 260. 
 53. Id. at 260–61. Specifically, Ali claimed that prosecution violated his Article III and Sixth 
Amendment jury trial rights, and that the court-martial could not have had jurisdiction under the Fifth 
Amendment’s due process clause. Id. 
 54. Specifically, the court noted:  
Neither Ali’s brief predeployment training at Fort Benning, Georgia, nor his employment 
with a United States corporation outside the United States constitutes a “substantial 
connection” with the United States . . . . Ultimately, we are unwilling to extend constitutional 
protections granted by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to a noncitizen who is neither present 
within the sovereign territory of the United States nor has established any substantial 
connections to the United States. 
Id. at 268 (citations omitted). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss5/8
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Finally, the Court determined that “[w]hatever rights [Ali] had were 
met through the court-martial process.”55 While that may be true, it does 
not address the underlying concern with the holding—that Ali’s 
connections with the U.S. were too attenuated for him to be accorded 
protections under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
56
 Were Ali to go 
uncorrected, it would be possible for Congress, or even the President 
acting alone, to create an alternative structure, or simply prosecute non-
citizen, non-residents without due process of law.
57
 
Ali and Brehm present nearly identical factual scenarios. In each, a 
non-citizen contractor with no connection to the United States other than 
employment by a defense contractor was charged for assaulting a fellow 
non-citizen.
58
 The two appellate courts that considered the cases came to 
opposite conclusions regarding the significance of the defendants’ 
connections with the United States. While agreeing that the defendants’ 
conduct was sufficiently connected to the United States for prosecution, 
they disagreed as to whether those connections entitled the defendants to 
constitutional protections.
59
 This is a significant circuit split. The potential 
ramifications are wide-ranging and encompass military law, criminal law, 
and, potentially, civil law. 
II. IS ALI JUSTIFIED? 
A. The Jurisprudential Backdrop 
1. Extraterritoriality up to Boumediene v. Bush 
Supreme Court jurisprudence around the question of whether, and 
what, constitutional protections should be accorded to defendants for 
 
 
 55. Id. at 268. It is indeed possible that, under the circumstances, Ali was accorded sufficient 
constitutional protections. But the CAAF’s determination that he was not deserving of any is seriously 
troubling. See Lawfare Staff & Steve Vladeck, Analysis of U.S. v. Ali: A Flawed Majority, Conflicting 
Concurrences, and the Future of Military Jurisdiction, LAWFARE (July 19, 2012, 8:09 PM), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/07/analysis-of-caaf-decision-in-ali/. For an argument that the 
expanded UCMJ jurisdiction is unconstitutional, see O’Connor, supra note 46. 
 56. See Ali, 71 M.J. at 269. 
 57. See discussion infra Part III (addressing potential ramifications of Ali outside of the military 
contractor context). 
 58. If anything, Ali was more connected to the U.S.—unlike Brehm, he had been to the U.S. 
before becoming employed. Compare Ali, 71 M.J. at 259 with United States v. Brehm, 691 F.3d 547, 
549 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 59. It could be contended that there was no need to perform an extraterritoriality analysis in 
Brehm once he was brought into the U.S. But if that were the only line, the government could avoid 
the application of due process rights by keeping similar defendants outside of the U.S. At that point, 
the executive branch would have the power to decide whether and when the Constitution applies—a 
proposition that is impossible to uphold. 
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crimes committed extraterritorially extends back to the Nineteenth 
Century.
60
 In re Ross concerned an appeal from a petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus.
61
 Ross, a British citizen, was a sailor on an American ship 
and killed a fellow sailor while in Yokohama Harbor. The American 
consul in Japan constituted a tribunal, which sentenced Ross to death. 
President Hayes commuted his sentence to life imprisonment.
62
 Ross 
claimed that the consular tribunal deprived him of his right to a jury trial.
63
 
The Court held that “[t]he Constitution can have no operation in another 
country.”64  
While Ross dealt with constitutional extraterritoriality, it had no 
bearing on non-citizens residing in the United States. In Wong Wing v. 
United States,
65
 the Court held that “even aliens shall not be held to 
answer for a capital or other infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a grand jury, nor be deprived of life, liberty or property 
without due process of law.”66 The Court rested its decision on the fact 
that the defendants, Chinese nationals, were “within the territorial 
jurisdiction” of the United States.67 Wong Wing was a departure from 
earlier cases in which the Court had declined to grant due process 
protections to defendants in immigration exclusion proceedings.
68
 
Professors Brilmeyer and Norchi argue, however, that: 
[E]xtraterritoriality presents a stronger case for Fifth Amendment 
scrutiny [than deportation]. The relevant position is found in Perez 
v. Brownell: “The restrictions confining Congress in the exercise of 
any of the powers expressly delegated to it in the Constitution apply 
with equal vigor when that body seeks to regulate our relations with 
other nations.”69 
 
 
 60. See, e.g., In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891). 
 61. Id. at 454. 
 62. Id. at 454–55. 
 63. See id. at 464. 
 64. Id. 
 65. 163 U.S. 228 (1896). Wong Wing is not properly termed a constitutional extraterritoriality 
case. It does, however, bear on the issues presented in Ali and Brehm. 
 66. Id. at 238. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (“The [deportation] 
proceeding before a United States judge . . . is in no proper sense a trial and sentence for a crime or 
offence. It is simply the ascertainment, by appropriate and lawful means, of the fact whether the 
conditions exist upon which Congress has enacted that an alien of this class may remain within the 
country.”), overruling recognized by Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 69. Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 28, at 1239 (quoting Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 58 
(1958), overruled in part by Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967)). The authors also note that the 
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The Court’s extraterritoriality jurisprudence during the Twentieth Century 
moved beyond historical concepts of territoriality when deciding 
constitutional issues as applied to non-citizen, non-residents.
70
 
The modern jurisprudence stems primarily from Johnson v. 
Eisentrager.
71
 In Johnson, a group of German nationals imprisoned in 
West Germany filed petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia.
72
 The petitioners had been 
prosecuted in a military tribunal after World War II for war crimes 
committed in China during the war.
73
 In their petition, they “claimed that 
their trial, conviction and imprisonment violate Articles I and III of the 
Constitution, and the Fifth Amendment . . . and other provisions of the 
Constitution . . . and provisions of the Geneva Convention governing 
treatment of prisoners of war.”74 
The Court began its opinion by discussing the different historical 
treatments of non-citizens.
75
 Noting the customary international law norms 
of citizenship, the Court stated, “even by the most magnanimous view, our 
law does not abolish inherent distinctions recognized throughout the 
civilized world between citizens and aliens, nor between aliens of friendly 
and of enemy allegiance.”76 The Court continued by discussing how a non-
citizen gains constitutional rights, drawing a direct link between the rights 
accorded and the individual’s “identity with our society.”77 
Ultimately, the Court determined that any “extraterritorial application 
of organic law would have been so significant an innovation in the 
practice of governments that, if intended or apprehended, it could scarcely 
have failed to excite contemporary comment.”78 Although the Court rested 
the holding on the grounds that the prisoners were not entitled to 
constitutional protections, it later addressed the ancillary claims that the 
tribunal lacked jurisdiction.
79
 Importantly, the military tribunal in question 
had jurisdiction and was competent to hear the prosecutions.
80
 
 
 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 721 (1987) “takes a firm position that the Bill of 
Rights applies to exercises of the foreign affairs power.” Id. at 1239 n.112. 
 70. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 71. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
 72. Id. at 765. 
 73. Id. at 766. 
 74. Id. at 767. 
 75. Id. at 768–69. 
 76. Id. at 769. 
 77. Id. at 770. 
 78. Id. at 784. 
 79. Id. at 785–91. 
 80. Id. at 789–90. Three justices in Johnson dissented, asserting that “the judicial rather than the 
executive branch of government is vested with final authority to determine the legality of 
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Seven years later, the Court decided companion cases on whether 
civilian dependents accompanying armed forces overseas could be subject 
to court-martial jurisdiction.
81
 Both of the dependents there were wives of 
members of the armed forces.
82
 Each woman had allegedly killed her 
husband and was subsequently charged, tried, and convicted by a court-
martial.
83
 At the outset, the Court stated, “[t]he United States is entirely a 
creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source. 
It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the 
Constitution.”84 The Court held that prosecuting the defendants in courts-
martial violated their Article III and Sixth Amendment jury trial rights, 
and their Fifth Amendment grand jury rights.
85
 
The Court also determined in Reid that the “make rules” clause of 
Article I, sec. 8 “does not extend to civilians—even though they may be 
dependents living with servicemen on a military base.”86 At the same time, 
the Court recognized “that there might be circumstances where a person 
could be ‘in’ the armed services for purposes of Clause 14 even though he 
had not formally been inducted into the military or did not wear a 
uniform.”87 
 
 
imprisonment for crime.” Id. at 791 (Black, J., dissenting). For further discussion of the dissent’s 
reasoning, see infra Part III.B. 
 81. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (plurality opinion). The cases were initially decided 
separately during October Term 1955. Id. at 1; see also Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956); Kinsella 
v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956). On petition for rehearing, the Court reversed the previous decisions. 
Reid, 354 U.S. at 5. During October Term 1955, the Court also decided United States ex rel. Toth v. 
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955). There, the Court determined that a provision in the 1950 UCMJ 
permitting court-martial jurisdiction over ex-service members was unconstitutional. Id. at 23. “For 
given its natural meaning, the power granted Congress ‘To make Rules’ to regulate ‘the land and naval 
Forces’ would seem to restrict court-martial jurisdiction to persons who are actually members or part 
of the armed forces.” Id. at 15. 
 82. Reid, 354 U.S. at 4–5. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 5–6 (footnote omitted). 
 85. Id. at 10, 41. See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rights that 
are unavailable in courts-martial. 
 86. Reid, 354 U.S. at 19 (plurality opinion.). 
 87. Id. at 23. The Court also decided three court-martial cases in 1960. See McElroy v. United 
States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); Kinsella v. 
United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960). In Kinsella, the Court extended the holding in 
Reid to encompass non-capital crimes committed by civilian dependents of members of the armed 
forces. 361 U.S. at 249. In so doing, the Court rejected arguments by the government that not 
permitting court-martial jurisdiction over civilian dependents would have an adverse impact on 
discipline because of the small number of cases that had been filed. Kinsella, 361 U.S. at 243–44. In 
Grisham and McElroy, the Court considered exercises of court-martial jurisdiction over civilian 
employees of the armed forces. Grisham, 361 U.S. at 280 (holding that capital cases against civilian 
employees are controlled by Reid); McElroy, 361 U.S. at 284 (holding that civilian employees could 
not constitutionally be prosecuted in courts-martial under 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(11)). 
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The next major case in which issues of constitutional extraterritoriality 
were raised was United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.
88
 Verdugo-Urquidez, 
a Mexican citizen, was suspected of involvement in the drug trade between 
Mexico and the United States.
89
 After his arrest in Mexico by Mexican 
police officers, he was transported to the U.S. border, where he was 
arrested by the Drug Enforcement Agency, which had previously obtained 
a warrant for his arrest.
90
 After his arrest, his residences in Mexico were 
searched by DEA agents, who were looking for evidence that would link 
Verdugo-Urquidez to drug trafficking.
91
 
The Defendant challenged the search of his home on Fourth 
Amendment grounds, claiming that it was an unlawful search or seizure 
because the government had not obtained a warrant prior to the search.
92
 
On certiorari to the Ninth Circuit, which had drawn heavily on Reid v. 
Covert and held that the Fourth Amendment protected Verdugo-Urquidez, 
the Supreme Court reversed and held that the Fourth Amendment has no 
extraterritorial application for non-citizens.
93
 The Court first distinguished 
Reid, based on textual differences between the clauses at issue there and 
the Fourth Amendment search and seizure clause, at issue in Verdugo-
Urquidez.
94
 The Court also relied on Eisentrager, stating that there, the 
“rejection of extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment was 
emphatic.”95  
Constitutional extraterritoriality re-emerged as an important legal issue 
during the “War on Terror,” most recently in Boumediene v. Bush.96 
 
 
 88. 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
 89. Id. at 262. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 263. The District Court suppressed the evidence seized during the searches, finding that 
the Fourth Amendment was in force and that the failure to procure a warrant violated the defendant’s 
rights. Id. 
 93. Id. at 263–64. The Ninth Circuit recognized that a warrant would have no practical effect in 
Mexico, but found that it “would have ‘substantial constitutional value in this country,’ because it 
would reflect a magistrate’s determination that there existed probable cause to search and would define 
the scope of the search.” Id. (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214, 1230 (9th 
Cir. 1988)). 
 94. Id. at 264–67.  
 95. Id. at 269. Thus, Verdugo-Urquidez created something of an anomaly in the constitutional 
extraterritoriality jurisprudence. Namely, that actions taken by the United States overseas are bound by 
the confines of the Constitution only when those acts affect United States citizens. Id. This is 
anomalous particularly because of the Plurality’s statement in Reid that “[t]he United States is entirely 
a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source. It can only act in 
accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution.” Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5–6 
(1957) (plurality opinion) (footnotes omitted). 
 96. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
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Boumediene involved terrorism detainees held at the U.S. Naval Station at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
97
 The group of non-citizen detainees filed 
petitions for writs of habeas corpus, which were denied because Congress 
had suspended the writ in the Military Commissions Act of 2006 
(“MCA”).98 In addition to the suspension, Congress had created an 
alternative structure under the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (“DTA”).99 
The Court determined that the suspension of the writ in the MCA was 
unconstitutional because the alternatives provided for in the DTA were 
insufficient.
100
 After a significant discussion of the purpose and policy 
behind the writ and its inclusion in the constitution, the Court addressed 
the extraterritoriality question.
101
 The crux of the government’s argument 
was that the writ could not be applied at Guantanamo Bay because 
historically it “ran only to territories over which the Crown was 
sovereign.”102 The Court disagreed with this interpretation, however, 
stating, “[t]he Court has discussed the issue of the Constitution’s 
extraterritorial application on many occasions. These decisions undermine 
the Government’s argument that, at least as applied to noncitizens, the 
Constitution necessarily stops where de jure sovereignty ends.”103 The 
 
 
 97. Id. at 732. 
 98. Id. at 732–33. The opinion did not specify the detainees’ countries of citizenship. See id. The 
Court did note, however, that they were apprehended in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and The Gambia, among 
other countries. Id. at 734. The Military Commissions Act stated, in relevant part, that: “No court, 
justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus 
filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has been determined by the United 
States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.” 28 
U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1) (2008), invalidated by Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723. 
 99. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 735. 
 100. Id. at 771–92. The DTA only allowed the Court of Appeals to 
assess whether the [Combatant Status Review Tribunal] complied with the “standards and 
procedures specified by the Secretary of Defense” and whether those standards and 
procedures are lawful. . . . In passing the DTA Congress did not intend to create a process that 
differs from traditional habeas corpus process in name only. It intended to create a more 
limited procedure. 
Id. at 777–78 (citation omitted). 
 101. Id. at 753–71. The two prevailing considerations in the history section were that the  
protection for the privilege of habeas corpus was one of the few safeguards of liberty 
specified in a Constitution that, at the outset, had no Bill of Rights” and that “settled 
precedents or legal commentaries in 1789 regarding the extraterritorial scope of the writ . . . 
[were] instructive for the present cases. 
Id. at 739. 
 102. Id. at 746. 
 103. Id. at 755. The D.C. Circuit has held that the Boumediene holding is limited to Suspension 
Clause claims. See, e.g., Ali v. Rumsfeld (Ali II), 649 F.3d 762 (D.C. Cir. 2011). But see United States 
v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that there must be a “sufficient nexus” between the 
defendant and the United States in order for extraterritorial application of a criminal statute to be 
constitutional). Additionally, it seems anomalous to hold that a writ of habeas corpus is available, but 
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Court recognized a “common thread” in the extraterritoriality cases: 
“questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical 
concerns, not formalism.”104 
2. Due Process as Applied to Non-Citizen Corporate Defendants 
Any discussion of due process would be incomplete without reference 
to International Shoe and its progeny.
105
 The Court’s personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence should inform the present discussion. In International Shoe, 
the Court held that an exercise of personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state 
defendant satisfies due process only if the defendant has sufficient contacts 
with the forum state, such that an exercise of jurisdiction comports with 
“‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”106 That case, in 
and of itself, is not particularly useful in the present discussion. What is 
illustrative is how the Court has applied it since then. Although numerous 
cases could be utilized here, we will focus on the two most recent personal 
jurisdiction cases: J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro
107
 and Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, SA v. Brown.
108
 
In McIntyre, the Court applied the International Shoe test to determine 
that J. McIntyre, the manufacturer of a metal-shearing machine, had 
insufficient contacts with New Jersey to be subject to suit in that state.
109
 
Goodyear involved the difference between specific and general personal 
jurisdiction.
110
 The holding is inapposite here; what is useful is that the 
Court applied personal jurisdiction concepts derived from the Fifth 
Amendment to analyze an exercise of jurisdiction over foreign subsidiaries 
of Goodyear USA for a bus accident that occurred in France.
111
 
 
 
that the detainee has no underlying constitutional claim to bring once the habeas petition is in front of 
a court. Contra Ali II, 649 F.3d 762. For a scholarly discussion of this issue, see Joshua Alexander 
Geltzer, Of Suspension, Due Process, and Guantanamo: The Reach of the Fifth Amendment After 
Boumediene and the Relationship Between Habeas Corpus and Due Process, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
719 (2012). 
 104. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764. The Court also cited In re Ross favorably, see id. at 760–62. 
 105. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 106. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 
U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 107. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (plurality opinion). 
 108. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
 109. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2785 (plurality opinion). 
 110. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851. 
 111. Id. at 2850. For a discussion of the continuing need for a “fully articulated theoretical 
justification that delineates the circumstances under which extraterritorial defendants may be subject to 
the jurisdiction of a state,” see Lea Brilmayer & Matthew Smith, The (Theoretical) Future of Personal 
Jurisdiction: Issues Left Open by Goodyear Dunlop Tires v. Brown and J. McIntyre Machinery v. 
Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 617, 619 (2012). The authors address the difficulties of a sovereignty-based 
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The Court has never explicitly held in its personal jurisdiction cases 
that constitutional protections apply to foreign corporations.
112
 It has, 
however, consistently limited plaintiffs’ ability to hale into court non-
citizen, non-resident defendants along the same due process lines as U.S. 
citizens.
113
 If corporations operating solely outside of the U.S. are entitled 
to constitutional protections in civil cases, it is intellectually untenable to 
refuse to apply the same protections to individual defendants in criminal 
cases. 
B. The Ali Problem 
In Ali, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces analyzed Ali’s 
claims as “constitutional protections,” failing to recognize that the Bill of 
Rights limits governmental power.
114
 This led to the erroneous statement 
that the court was “unwilling to extend constitutional protections granted 
by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to a noncitizen who is neither present 
within the sovereign territory of the United States nor has established any 
substantial connection to the United States.”115 At the same time, however, 
the court upheld the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over Ali.
116
 This 
ruling is contrary to Boumediene and to the implicit recognition of 
constitutional protections for corporate non-residents in the personal 
jurisdiction jurisprudence. 
The CAAF stated that there is no law “which mandates granting a 
noncitizen Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights when they have not ‘come 
within the territory of the United States and developed substantial 
connections with this country.’”117 It may be true that the Supreme Court 
 
 
analysis, id. at 623–25, and the meaning of McIntyre and Goodyear for international due process 
issues, id. at 632. 
 112. See, e.g., McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2785 (plurality opinion) (applying the Fourteenth 
Amendment due process test for personal jurisdiction to a non-citizen, non-resident defendant without 
specifically holding that it applies); Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853 (same). 
 113. See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. 2846; McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (plurality opinion); Asahi Metal 
Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. 
v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd. v. Compagnie de Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 
(1982). 
 114. United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 268 (C.A.A.F. 2012). But see United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 288 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The focus of the Fourth Amendment is 
on what the Government can and cannot do, and how it may act . . . .”); and Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 
1, 5–6 (1957) (plurality opinion) (“The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. . . . It 
can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution.”) (footnote omitted). 
For another analysis of the three opinions in Ali, see Lawfare Staff & Vladeck, supra note 55. 
 115. Ali, 71 M.J. at 268. 
 116. Id. at 265. 
 117. Id. at 268 (quoting Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271 (majority opinion)). 
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has never mandated extraterritorial application of due process rights. That 
reasoning fails to account, however, for the holding in Boumediene that 
certain constitutional rights do limit the power of the United States when 
acting outside of its de jure sovereignty.
118
 The CAAF also failed to 
recognize that its holding grants the President an extra-constitutional 
power. The executive can now prosecute any non-citizen, non-resident 
defendant for any crime without any due process, so long as the defendant 
is kept out of the grip of an Article III court and out of the United States. 
There are four principal concerns with the Ali holding. First, the court 
read Boumediene too narrowly. Second, the court failed to acknowledge 
that Congress expressly contemplated the application of due process. 
Third, the court created the absurd result that a greater degree of protection 
is now given to enemy combatants than to civilian contractors. Finally, the 
court’s failure to acknowledge the foundational concept of constitutional 
law that “[t]he United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution”119 
and that its power is limited by the Constitution. 
1. Boumediene Should Not be Limited to the Suspension Clause 
The government has attempted to limit the Boumediene holding solely 
to the Suspension Clause.
120
 In the alternative, the government has 
attempted to limit Boumediene’s effects to Guantanamo Bay, because it 
has a unique history of sovereignty.
121
 While these arguments are 
compelling, they fail to address two overriding concerns. First, the 
sections of the Constitution at issue are proscriptive—they limit how 
government can act.
122
 Second, the United States exerts a pervasive and 
 
 
 118. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008) (“Even when the United States acts outside 
its borders, its powers are not ‘absolute and unlimited’ but are subject ‘to such restrictions as are 
expressed in the Constitution.’”) (quoting Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44 (1885)) (footnote 
omitted). 
 119. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1957) (plurality opinion). 
 120. See, e.g., Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 
(D.C. Cir. 2010); Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 121. Rasul, 563 F.3d. at 531–32. 
 122. Marbury v. Madison states, 
To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to 
writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? The 
distinction, between a government with limited and unlimited powers, is abolished, if those 
limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts 
allowed, are of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the 
constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may alter the 
constitution by an ordinary act.  
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controlling influence in many parts of the world.
123
 If the judicial power of 
the United States is going to follow its military and economic power, that 
jurisdictional exercise must be limited according to the Constitution’s 
proscriptions. 
In Brehm, the court held that “[a]lthough [Kandahar Airfield] was not 
technically territory of the United States, the American influence was so 
pervasive that we think it a suitable proxy for due process purposes, such 
that the imposition of American criminal law there is not arbitrary.”124 
Thus, because American criminal statutes could have effect in Afghanistan 
as a result of the pervasive American influence at Kandahar Airfield, due 
process protections should necessarily follow. In Brehm, the court skipped 
a determination of whether due process protections attached, assumed they 
did, and used a due process analysis to determine whether an exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant was appropriate.
125
 
The pervasive influence test is more adequately aligned with the reality 
of contemporary geo-politics than is a traditional sovereignty analysis. The 
sovereignty analysis in Boumediene was both the most expeditious and the 
most conservative approach possible in that case—but it need not be the 
outer limit of constitutional extraterritoriality. It may be possible to work 
out a case for de facto United States sovereignty on armed forces bases 
overseas. But such contortions are unnecessary. The Court should instead 
adopt the pervasive influence test from Brehm—an adequate, and more 
realistic, substitute.  
 
 
 Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution is either a 
superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary 
legislative acts, and like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it. 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176–77 (1803). 
 123. As of March 31, 2014, there were 1,354,054 active duty military personnel. U.S. DEP’T OF 
DEF., TOTAL MILITARY PERSONNEL AND DEPENDENT END STRENGTH FOR MARCH 31, 2014 (2014), 
available at https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/reports.do?category=reports&subCat=milActDutReg 
(follow “Total DoD – March 31, 2014 (DMDC Data)” link) (last accessed June 28, 2014). The total 
civilian employment for the Department of Defense was 716,797 as of March, 2014. U.S. DEP’T OF 
DEF., QUARTERLY REPORT OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT (SF-113_A FORMAT) (2014), 
available at https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/appj/dwp/getLinks.do?category=dod&subCat=reports&tab= 
3&clOn=reps (follow “Civilian Personnel” link; click “FY 2014” link; click “March 2014” link; click 
“Consolidated DoD” link) (last accessed June 28, 2014). 
 124. United States v. Brehm, 691 F.3d 547, 553 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 125. Id. Of course, Brehm was also within the U.S. when he was tried, so although his crime was 
extra-territorial, his prosecution was not. This cannot resolve the issue presented, however, as 
previously discussed. Supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
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2. Congress and an Advisory Committee Contemplated Due Process 
Protections 
The Report of the Overseas Jurisdiction Advisory Committee 
contemplated the issues presented in Ali and Brehm.
126
 The OJAC was 
established by the 1996 Defense Authorization Act, in response to 
concerns regarding jurisdictional issues for civilians accompanying the 
armed forces overseas.
127
 While noting that “the proposed legislation 
[MEJA] is intended primarily to apply to U.S. citizens or nationals serving 
with, employed by or accompanying the armed forces outside the United 
States,” the OJAC addressed at length the particular difficulties presented 
by “third country nationals,” or those who are not citizens of the U.S. or 
the host country.
128
 
The Report stated that “in the view of the committee, the exercise 
of . . . jurisdiction could be justified when such individuals are present in 
the foreign jurisdiction because of their association or affiliation with the 
U.S. armed forces and when, but for prosecution by U.S. authorities, their 
crimes would go unpunished.”129 Although the OJAC did not specifically 
address constitutional extraterritoriality, it is implicit in the Report that the 
committee expected that any extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction would 
necessarily be accompanied by procedural protections.
130
 
In MEJA, Congress contemplated that jurisdiction over extraterritorial 
acts would necessarily be limited by the Bill of Rights.
131
 First, § 3262(a) 
requires probable cause for arrest.
132
 Second, § 3262(b) requires that a 
suspect be placed in civilian custody “as soon as practicable . . . for 
removal to the United States for judicial proceedings . . . .”133 Finally, 
§ 3265 addresses the initial hearing that was a point of concern for the 
OJAC.
134
 Subsection (a) discusses the probable cause hearing, while 
subsection (b) speaks to the pretrial detention hearing.
135
 Each of these 
three procedural aspects demonstrates recognition by Congress that 
 
 
 126. OJAC REPORT, supra note 2, at 61. 
 127. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, § 1151, 110 
Stat. 186 (1996). 
 128. OJAC REPORT, supra note 2, at 61–62. 
 129. Id. at 62. 
 130. See id. at 63–64 (discussing timing of initial hearing before magistrate judge, which is 
required by the Fourth Amendment and supposed to take place within forty-eight hours of arrest). 
 131. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3262, 3265 (2000). 
 132. 18 U.S.C. § 3262(a) (2000). 
 133. 18 U.S.C. § 3262(b) (2000). 
 134. 18 U.S.C. § 3265 (2000). 
 135. Id. 
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criminal jurisdiction is accompanied by constitutional protections. Had 
Congress intended that third country nationals be treated differently than 
U.S. or host country nationals, it could have provided for that scenario. 
That is not what Congress did.
136
 
3. Civilian Contractors and Enemy Combatants 
The court in Ali relied heavily on Johnson v. Eistentrager
137
 in holding 
that the Fifth Amendment has no extraterritorial effect for non-citizens.
138
 
Johnson is distinguishable, however, on a number of grounds. Most 
importantly, it dealt with enemy combatants.
139
 The Court was careful to 
highlight the “inherent distinctions recognized throughout the civilized 
world . . . between aliens of friendly and of enemy allegiance.”140 The 
Court noted that friendly non-citizens have “been accorded a generous and 
ascending scale of rights as [they increase their] identity with our 
society.”141 
Although the Court’s discussion of enemy non-citizens in Johnson 
draws heavily on notions of territorial sovereignty, the overriding concern 
appears to be the maintenance of war-time security.
142
 Even enemy non-
citizens who are present within the United States are accorded less access 
to the courts and fewer protections.
143
 In determining that the Johnson 
 
 
 136. Of course, the fact that Congress extended procedural rights to contractors begs the question. 
Even if non-citizen, non-residents are not protected by the Constitution, Congress could extend the 
same protections to them. While the fact that they did so is not dispositive, it is persuasive evidence of 
that branch of government’s interpretation of the Constitution. 
 137. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
 138. United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 267–68 (C.A.A.F.) (citing Johnson to conclude that the 
court was “unwilling to extend constitutional protections granted by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments 
to a noncitizen who is neither present within the sovereign territory of the United States nor has 
established any substantial connections to the United States.”). 
 139. Johnson, 339 U.S. at 765. 
 140. Id. at 769. 
 141. Id. at 770. The crucial aspect appears to be the connection between the defendant and 
American society. See Ali, 71 M.J. at 267–68. If, as in Ali or Brehm, the defendant is working for a 
military contractor overseas during a time of armed conflict, it would seem to follow that the defendant 
is quite connected to our society, even though he has never set foot in the United States. United States 
v. Brehm, 691 F.3d 547, 552 (4th Cir. 2012). But in Johnson, the Court discussed this primarily in 
terms of territoriality. Johnson, 339 U.S. at 770–71.  
 142. See id. at 774. 
 143. A unanimous Court recently clarified both the privilege of access to our courts and the 
limitations upon it. We said: 
The ancient rule against suits by resident alien enemies has survived only so far as necessary 
to prevent use of the courts to accomplish a purpose which might hamper our own war efforts 
or give aid to the enemy. This may be taken as the sound principle of the common law today. 
Id. at 776 (quoting Ex parte Kawato, 317 U.S. 69, 75 (1942)). 
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prisoners did not have standing, the Court cited six factors. Of these, four 
were specific to enemy combatants.
144
 
In addition to the specifics of the Johnson decision, it is notable that 
there is an international regime governing the treatment of prisoners of 
war.
145
 The Third Geneva Convention requires that prisoners of war “be 
tried only by a military court, unless the existing laws of the Detaining 
Power expressly permit the civil courts to try a member of the armed 
forces of the Detaining Power in respect of the particular offence alleged 
to have been committed by the prisoner of war.”146 Because the United 
States is bound by the Convention, which contains numerous procedural 
and substantive protections for prisoners of war, it is not necessary to 
accord duplicative constitutional protections to such defendants. Indeed, 
provisions of the Convention, such as Article 84, appear to permit 
limitations on certain constitutional rights, such as the right to trial by 
jury.
147
 
If third country nationals, such as Ali and Brehm, are not to be 
accorded constitutional rights, they would therefore receive fewer 
protections than prisoners of war. While some might object to the rights 
 
 
 144. Id. at 777. The six factors were:  
[H]e (a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in the United States; (c) was 
captured outside of our territory and there held in military custody as a prisoner of war; 
(d) was tried and convicted by a Military Commission sitting outside the United States; (e) for 
offenses against laws of war committed outside the United States; (f) and is at all times 
imprisoned outside the United States. 
Id. 
 145. See generally Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364 [hereinafter Geneva Convention]. Ch. III (Arts. 82–108) of 
the Convention deals with Penal and Disciplinary Sanctions. Judicial Proceedings are addressed in 
Articles 99–108. 
 146. Geneva Convention, art. 84. 
 147. Compare Geneva Convention, art. 84 (“A prisoner of war shall be tried only by a military 
court, unless the existing laws of the Detaining Power expressly permit the civil courts to try a member 
of the armed forces of the Detaining Power in respect of the particular offence alleged to have been 
committed by the prisoner of war. In no circumstances whatever shall a prisoner of war be tried by a 
court of any kind which does not offer the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality as 
generally recognized, and, in particular, the procedure of which does not afford the accused the rights 
and means of defence provided for in Article 105.”), with U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (guaranteeing life 
tenure and salary protection), U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, 
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia . . . .”), and U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all 
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”). 
 Courts-martial are not overseen by Article III judges, do not require grand juries, and have no jury 
trial right or unanimous verdict requirement. Thus, the Geneva Convention mandates that enemy 
combatants will receive different procedural protections than civilian defendants. See supra text 
accompanying notes 46–48. 
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given to prisoners of war,
148
 the United States is bound by the Third 
Geneva Convention.
149
 But if Ali and Brehm are deserving of no 
constitutional protections, they will be placed at a disadvantage to those 
who have carried out acts of aggression against the United States.
150
 Such 
an anomalous result cannot be justified when third country nationals have 
aided the war effort and are subjected to the judicial power of the United 
States. 
4. Undermining the Foundational Principles Recognized in Reid 
Reid v. Covert
151
 began with the proposition that “[t]he United States is 
entirely a creature of the Constitution.”152 That proposition, of course, 
extends back to the earliest cases regarding the United States’ 
governmental structure.
153
 And yet, the Court of Appeals for the Armed 
Forces held that the United States can exercise criminal jurisdiction over 
certain defendants outside of the constraints of the Constitution, so long as 
they are kept out of the United States’ de jure sovereignty.154 That cuts 
against the recognition in Reid, reiterated in Verdugo-Urquidez, that the 
 
 
 148. See, e.g., ROBERT H. DIERKER, JR., Tolerance of Terror, in THE TYRANNY OF TOLERANCE: A 
SITTING JUDGE BREAKS THE CODE OF SILENCE TO EXPOSE THE LIBERAL JUDICIAL ASSAULT 184–200 
(2006). 
 Additionally, in the War on Terror, it is fairly easy to circumvent the need to give judicial 
protections to terrorists by simply not bringing them within the judicial power of the United States. 
Under President Obama, the number of drone strikes has increased significantly, most of them being 
used to summarily execute non-citizen terrorists, see Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret ‘Kill List’ 
Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, at A1, or even U.S. 
citizens, see Mark Mazzetti, Eric Schmitt & Robert F. Worth, C.I.A. Strike Kills U.S.-Born Militant in 
a Car in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2011, at A1. See also Samuel S. Adelsberg, Bouncing the 
Executive’s Blank Check: Judicial Review and the Targeting of Citizens, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
437 (2012). President Obama has been heavily criticized, in both scholarly legal circles and the press, 
for targeted drone strikes, particularly those on American citizens. See, e.g., Andrew Rosenthal, Op-
Ed., Are Targeted Killings Legal?, TAKING NOTE, N.Y. TIMES (May 8, 2012, 4:00 PM), 
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/08/are-targeted-killings-legal/; Michael Epstein, Note, 
The Curious Case of Anwar Al-Aulaqi: Is Targeting a Terrorist for Execution by Drone Strike a Due 
Process Violation when the Terrorist is a United States Citizen?, 19 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 723 (2011). 
 149. Geneva Convention, supra note 145 (entered into force with respect to the United States, 
Feb. 2, 1956). 
 150. See discussion infra Part III. 
 151. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
 152. Id. at 5–6 (plurality opinion) (citing Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 326 (1816); Ex 
parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 119, 136–137 (1866); Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 
477 (1939); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942)). 
 153. See, e.g., Martin, 14 U.S. at 326 (“The government, then, of the United States, can claim no 
powers which are not granted to it by the constitution, and the powers actually granted, must be such 
as are expressly given, or given by necessary implication.”). 
 154. United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 268 (C.A.A.F. 2012). 
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age of formalistic territoriality in constitutional jurisprudence is over.
155
 
As yet, no President has attempted to assert the ability to act beyond his 
constitutional powers, although some have come close.
156
 Accepting the 
court’s holding in Ali would undermine the consistent interpretation that 
the United States cannot act except within the strictures of the 
Constitution. It would also usher in a new era of unconstrained executive 
power—an era exclusively of the judiciary’s creation. 
III. LOOKING BEYOND ALI 
Although the facts of Ali are quite narrow, its potential applications are 
broad. This section will first address the potential application of the Ali 
rule in three situations outside of its narrow factual context. Part III 
concludes with proposed solutions to the Ali problem. 
A. Who Will be Harmed by the Ali Rule? 
1. Brehm-Type Defendants: Judge Effron’s “Open Question” 
In his concurrence in Ali, Judge Effron asserted that the discussion of 
constitutional rights in the majority opinion was unnecessary to that 
case.
157
 He then addressed the question that “would arise under the ‘least 
possible power adequate to the end proposed’ test if the conduct at issue 
involved a DoD civilian or DoD contractor employee who, as third-
[country] national, would be subject to Article III coverage under 
MEJA.”158 To Judge Effron, the predominant concerns in subjecting 
civilians to court-martial jurisdiction are separation of powers and 
constitutional structure, not due process.
159
 
 
 
 155. Compare Reid, 354 U.S. at 5–6 (plurality opinion) (“The United States is entirely a creature 
of the Constitution.”), with In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891) (“The Constitution can have no 
operation in another country.”). 
 156. President Obama has consistently refused to release Department of Justice memoranda 
regarding the constitutionality of his asserting sole authority to authorize the targeted killing of 
American citizens accused of participating in terrorist organizations. See Vicki Divoll, Who Says You 
Can Kill Americans, Mr. President?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/ 
17/opinion/who-says-you-can-kill-americans-mr-president.html. President George W. Bush likewise 
refused to release memoranda regarding his power to authorize and utilize “enhanced interrogation 
techniques” (regarded by many as torture) against War on Terror detainees. See Mark Mazzetti & 
Scott Shane, Memos Spell Out Brutal C.I.A. Mode of Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2009, at A1. 
 157. Ali, 71 M.J. at 280 (Effron, J., concurring). 
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. at 282 (Effron, J., concurring) (“The import of the differences between courts-martial and 
Article III courts primarily concerns constitutional structure, not due process.”) (citing Kinsella v. 
United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960)). 
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The structural issues at play include “separation of powers, the role of 
Article III as the foundation for criminal trials, and the function of trial by 
jury as a limitation on governmental power.”160 Judges in courts-martial 
are military officers and therefore, unlike judges in Article III courts, serve 
at the pleasure of the President and do not have life tenure or salary 
protection.
161
 As such, “[t]he organization of courts-martial . . . reflects a 
long tradition of concentrating power in the Executive Branch.”162 
Allowing further concentration of power in the executive would 
undermine the constitutional structure and devalue “[t]he Constitution, as 
a source of authority and limitation on power.”163 
While courts-martial are concerned with criminal justice, they also 
serve a fundamental disciplinary role with which the civilian criminal 
justice system is not concerned.
164
 Judge Effron concluded by noting that 
the civilian court-martial cases required  
an assessment of whether the statute at issue, on its face and as 
applied, fits within the narrow range of constitutional exceptions to 
the requirements of Article III. Such an assessment requires 
consideration of whether the exercise of jurisdiction . . . involves 
the “least possible power adequate to the end proposed.”165 
Although Judge Effron declined to answer his open question on 
standing grounds,
166
 the answer is clear. Where it is practicable without 
sacrificing a legitimate and serious governmental interest, the UCMJ 
should not be applied to civilians who fall under MEJA jurisdiction.
167
  
 
 
 160. Id. at 281 (citing Singleton, 361 U.S. at 237–38, 246–47; Reid, 354 U.S. at 10, 22, 36, 38–39; 
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17–18 (1955)). 
 161. Note, Military Justice and Article III, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1909, 1909 (1990). 
 162. Ali, 71 M.J. at 281 (Effron, J., concurring). 
 163. Id. at 282. 
 164. Id. (“The military justice system exists as an instrument of command . . . .”). 
 165. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Toth, 350 U.S. at 23). 
 166. Id. (“The constitutionality of UCMJ jurisdiction over civilians other than host-country 
nationals is an open question, and should remain so until properly developed and briefed in a case 
involving parties having a direct interest in the scope of such a decision.”). For a discussion of the 
benefits and drawbacks of the expanded UCMJ jurisdiction, see Cullen, supra note 5. For a discussion 
of the constitutionality of the expanded UCMJ jurisdiction, see O’Connor, supra note 46. 
 167. Toth, 350 U.S. at 23 (“Determining the scope of the constitutional power of Congress to 
authorize trial by court-martial presents another instance calling for limitation to ‘the least possible 
power adequate to the end proposed.’”) (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 231 (1821)). 
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2. Enemy Combatants in the War on Terror 
Much of the recent jurisprudence surrounding extraterritoriality has 
involved enemy combatants from the “War on Terror.”168 Continued 
application of the Ali rule would strip Boumediene of its meaning and 
allow the continued detention of enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba, and other facilities around the world. Even if those combatants are 
eventually prosecuted, at least some of them could receive no due process, 
as the United States has consistently asserted that al Qaeda members are 
not prisoners-of-war under the Geneva Convention.
169
 
Of particular concern are drone strikes against enemy combatants.
170
 
Here, there are two different issues posed. On the one hand are American 
citizens, the most notable of whom to have been executed is Anwar al-
Awlaki.
171
 On the other are non-citizen, non-residents.
172
 If the Court were 
to decide that non-resident, non-citizen military contractors without 
significant connections to the United States are entitled to due process 
protections, it may be seen as anomalous to allow the targeted killing—
without any judicial determination of guilt—of American citizens 
abroad.
173
 Granting procedural rights to defendants like Ali and Brehm 
 
 
 168. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Kiyemba v. Obama, 605 F.3d 1046 
(D.C. Cir. 2010); Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 169. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 
for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Hynes II, General Counsel of the 
Dep’t of Defense, Re: Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 22, 
2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-laws-taliban-detainees.pdf. 
 170. Salman Masood & Ismail Khan, Drone Kills a Pakistani Militant Behind Attacks on U.S. 
Forces, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2013, at A4. 
 171. Mazzetti, supra note 148. 
 172. Becker, supra note 148. 
 173. In Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, Anwar al-Awlaki’s father sued for injunctive relief to prevent al-
Awlaki’s targeted killing. 727 F. Supp. 2d. 1 (D.D.C. 2010). The defendants, President Obama, the 
Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, moved for dismissal. Id. at 
8. After noting that the case was “unique and extraordinary,” the court posed a number of hypothetical 
questions in a lengthy paragraph at the outset of the opinion. Id. Most interesting to the present 
discussion is the first: “How is it that judicial approval is required when the United States decides to 
target a U.S. citizen overseas for electronic surveillance, but that, according to defendants, judicial 
scrutiny is prohibited when the United States decides to target a U.S. citizen overseas for death?” Id. 
 The court went on to hold in favor of the defendants on each defense, finding that (1) al-Awlaki’s 
father lacked “next friend” standing, id. at 17; (2) al-Awlaki’s father lacked jus tertii standing, id. at 
25; (3) “[e]ven assuming [that standing was satisfied], there is no basis for the assertion that the threat 
of a future state-sponsored extrajudicial killing . . . constitutes a tort in violation of the ‘law of 
nations,’” id. at 37; (4) even if a threat constituted a violation of the law of nations, the father was not 
authorized to bring a claim under the Alien Tort Statute, id. at 40; and (5) the suit was barred by the 
political question doctrine, id. at 52. 
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could also be seen as opening the door to requiring judicial protections for 
non-citizen, non-residents targeted for killing.
174
 
Targeted killings, however, are distinguishable.
175
 Professors Murphy 
and Radsan offer a compelling analysis of how—and how much—process 
must be granted to targets.
176
 They place particular emphasis on the impact 
of the Hamdi and Boumediene cases, and conclude that, because detained 
enemy combatants must have due process rights, so too must enemy 
combatants who are targeted for killing.
177
 The authors suggest two main 
avenues for providing process protections.
178
 First, limited access to courts 
to challenge killings ex post, similar to Bivens claims.
179
 Second, 
procedural protections internal to the executive branch, including a 
review—independent of the CIA—of all decisions to target specific 
individuals.
180
 Because of the unique nature of targeted killings, these 
protections could be sufficient even under the due process framework 
established by Hamdi and Boumediene.
181
 But under the Ali majority’s 
holding, the Constitution mandates no due process whatsoever. 
3. Defendants in Other Extraterritorial Criminal Prosecutions 
As the economy becomes ever more globalized, the United States is 
expanding its jurisdictional reach far beyond its territorial borders.
182
 A 
number of recent extraterritoriality cases have made it into the news, 
including the indictment of five Chinese military hackers,
183
 the arrest of 
 
 
 174. See also Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior 
Operational Leader of Al-Qa’ida or An Associated Force (U.S. Dep’t of Justice White Paper, Nov. 8, 
2011), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/doj-lethal.pdf. 
 175. See Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing of 
Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405 (2009). Murphy and Radsan argue that there must be some 
semblance of process when terrorists are subjected to “targeted killing,” defined as “extra-judicial, 
premeditated killing by a state of a specifically identified person not in its custody.” Id. at 406, 409–
10. 
 176. See generally id. 
 177. Id. at 450. 
 178. Id. at 437–50. 
 179. Id. at 437–45; see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388 (1971). Bivens claims are suits against federal officials for violations of constitutional 
rights. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.  
 180. Murphy & Radsan, supra note 175, at 445–50. 
 181. Id. at 450. 
 182. See Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 28, at 1223. 
 183. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for Cyber 
Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization for Commercial Advantage (May 19, 
2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/May/14-ag-528.html; see also Michael S. 
Schmidt & David E. Sanger, 5 in China Army Face U.S. Charges of Cyberattacks, N.Y. TIMES (May 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss5/8
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Kim Schmitz (a.k.a. Kim Dotcom),
184
 warrantless wiretapping,
185
 and 
intellectual property theft.
186
 
If, as the Ali court asserted, the Constitution is not binding on the 
United States government outside of the de jure territory, defendants in 
these and other, similar, prosecutions would not receive any procedural 
protections.
187
 Any number of extreme hypotheticals could result, but it is 
also entirely possible that the stripping away of protections would be so 
gradual as to go nearly unnoticed. 
In each of the three categories that could be harmed by the Ali rule, the 
fundamental concern is that our government is one of enumerated powers, 
and those enumerations include proscriptions on government’s power in 
criminal prosecutions.
188
 Individual rights and protections flow from that 
foundation. Certain constitutional rights are of limited value abroad, but 
many are fundamental to any criminal prosecution by the United States.
189
 
Our status as the global hegemon should not mean that we have free reign 
to assert our might wherever we please while treating foreign defendants 
more harshly than our own citizens. A solution to the Ali problem is 
therefore necessary in order to avoid the potential results of its broader 
application. 
B. Defining the Necessary Nexus Between the Defendant and the United 
States 
In order for a non-citizen defendant to be accorded constitutional 
rights, it is necessary to discern a test to define when the individual has a 
connection with the United States sufficient to give rise to constitutional 
protections. Because the United States is a creation of the Constitution, it 
 
 
19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/us/us-to-charge-chinese-workers-with-cyberspying. 
html?smid=pl-share. 
 184. Jonathan Hutchinson, Mogul Goes From Shady to Admired, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2012, at B1. 
 185. Alison Smale, Anger Growing Among Allies on U.S. Spying, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2013, at 
A1; Charlie Savage & James Risen, Federal Judge Finds N.S.A. Wiretaps Were Illegal, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 1, 2010, at A1. 
 186. Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Office, E.D. Va., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Top Executives At Kolon 
Industries Indicted For Stealing DuPont’s Kevlar Trade Secrets (Oct. 18, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/vae/news/ 2012/10/20121018kolonnr.html. 
 187. See United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 268 (C.A.A.F. 2012). 
 188. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803) (“To what purpose are powers limited, and to 
what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by 
those intended to be restrained?”). 
 189. A search warrant, for example, has no effect outside of U.S. territory. See United States v. 
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 279 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). But if the 
United States decides to enforce its criminal laws extraterritorially, the Constitution must follow. See 
Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 28, at 1239. 
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should make sense that non-citizen, non-resident defendants should be 
accorded constitutional rights when they are prosecuted. The United States 
should not be capable of acting outside of the scope of its Constitution. 
The holding in Verdugo-Urquidez, however, indicates that certain rights, 
by their nature, may be incapable of attaching outside of the territorial 
confines of the United States.
190
 
The cases indicate that there are at least three possible tests. First, the 
strict de jure sovereignty test, adopted in Ali and based on a generous 
reading of Johnson v. Eisentrager.
191
 Second, “nature of the rights test”, 
based principally on Verdugo-Urquidez, under which the applicability of a 
right depends on the nature of that right.
192
 Finally, the “any-exercise 
rule”: any exercise of the judicial power creates a nexus between the 
defendant and the United States, and the judicial power of the United 
States is always restricted by the procedural protections in the 
Constitution, absent a constitutional exception.
193
 Having already 
discussed the problems with the de jure sovereignty test,
194
 I will focus 
here on the two alternatives: the nature of the rights test and the any-
exercise rule. 
1. The Nature of the Rights Test 
In Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court examined both the text of the 
Fourth Amendment and practical considerations before determining that it 
did not apply in Mexico, where the defendant’s home was located.195 The 
Verdugo-Urquidez rationale was applied in United States v. Davis
196
 to a 
ship apprehended by the U.S. Coast Guard approximately 100 miles off 
the coast of California.
197
 Because the vessel was located outside of the 
territorial sovereignty of the United States, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
Fourth Amendment had no force.
198
 
There are strong indications in Verdugo-Urquidez that the same 
considerations that factored into the Court’s decision on the Fourth 
 
 
 190. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 261 (holding that there is no Fourth Amendment search or 
seizure protection outside of the United States). 
 191. See Ali, 71 M.J. at 267 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 783 (1950)). 
 192. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264–65. 
 193. Id. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 279–97 (Brennan, J., dissenting); 
Johnson, 339 U.S. at 791 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 194. See supra Part II. 
 195. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 273–74. 
 196. 905 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 197. Id. at 247. 
 198. Id. at 251 (citing Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 261). 
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Amendment would require finding that certain other constitutional 
protections do apply extraterritorially.
199
 First, the textual analysis 
contrasts the Fourth Amendment, which protects “the people,” with the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments, which protect “person[s]” and “accused.”200 
Second, while the Court did not address the extraterritoriality of Fifth 
Amendment protections, it did note that “conduct by law enforcement 
officials prior to trial may ultimately impair [Fourth Amendment] right[s], 
[but] a [Fifth Amendment] violation occurs only at trial.”201 
Because Fifth and Sixth Amendment violations are perfected only at 
trial, the case for applying those protections to all defendants becomes all 
the stronger. Once a defendant is in custody of the United States and 
subjected to its judicial power, it is not unduly burdensome to expect 
courts to apply the same standards that are applied to citizen or resident 
non-citizen defendants. The same notion should apply equally to both 
prosecutions in courts-martial and civilian courts. As such, a “nature of the 
rights” test would merely require courts to apply consistent standards at 
trial in order to prevent violation of foundational procedural rights.
202
 
2. The Any-Exercise Rule 
The preferable option is the any-exercise rule: whenever the United 
States asserts its judicial power, whether in Article III or non-Article III 
tribunals, that exercise of power is constrained by the Constitution.
203
 The 
rule is founded on three sources. First, Justice Black’s dissent in 
Johnson.
204
 Second, Justice Stevens’s concurrence in Verdugo-
Urquidez.
205
 Third, Justice Brennan’s dissent in Verdugo-Urquidez.206 The 
 
 
 199. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264–69 (discussing differences in extraterritorial 
treatment of various rights). 
 200. Id. at 265–66. 
 201. Id. at 264 (citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972)). 
 202. It may be asserted that the effects on defendants would be slight and the burden on the 
government great, but  
[s]light encroachments create new boundaries from which legions of power can seek new 
territory to capture. . . . “[I]llegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in 
that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. 
This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the 
security of person and property should be liberally construed.” 
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 39–40 (1957) (plurality opinion) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 
616, 635 (1886)). 
 203. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 791 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 204. Id. at 791–96. 
 205. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 206. Id. at 279–97 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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two dissents start from substantially the same proposition: “[E]qual justice 
[is] not for citizens alone, but for all persons coming within the ambit of 
our power.”207 
Justice Brennan framed his argument around two concepts. First, 
“basic notions of mutuality[:] If we expect aliens to obey our laws, aliens 
should be able to expect that we will obey our Constitution when we 
investigate, prosecute, and punish them.”208 Second, a textual-historical 
argument that the Bill of Rights does not create rights in people, but 
instead focuses “on what the Government can and cannot do, and how it 
may act, not on against whom these actions may be taken.”209 
The any-exercise rule should be adopted because it recognizes the 
fundamental principle that any action of the United States must be both 
authorized and constrained by the Constitution. To adopt the nature of the 
rights test, the Court would have to hold that there are instances in which 
one or more branches of government are competent to act, but 
unconstrained in method. The extraterritoriality jurisprudence is 
complicated by the fact that much of it stems from the prosecution of 
enemy non-citizens.
210
 Because the laws of war, in particular the Third 
Geneva Convention, apply to those prosecutions, those holdings are 
inapposite in a “run-of-the-mill assault” prosecution.211 Prosecutions for 
run-of-the-mill assaults in the courts of the United States should all be 
subject to the constraints and protections of the Constitution. 
It may be argued that the holding in Verdugo-Urquidez prevents 
adopting the any-exercise rule.
212
 Such a reading of Verdugo-Urquidez 
would misconstrue that case and, more importantly, the nature of the rights 
at stake. There, the defendant asserted that the DEA violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights by searching his home in Mexico.
213
 The case is 
distinguishable on two grounds. First, the Mexican government was the 
authority competent to authorize the search—not the United States.214 
 
 
 207. Johnson, 339 U.S. at 791 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 284 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Respondent is entitled to the protections of the Fourth Amendment because 
our Government . . . has treated him as a member of our community for purposes of enforcing our 
laws. He has become, quite literally, one of the governed.”). 
 208. Verdugo–Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 209. Id. at 288. 
 210. See, e.g., Johnson, 339 U.S. at 765; Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 18 (1942). 
 211. United States v. Brehm, 691 F.3d 547, 551 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 212. See United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 268 (C.A.A.F. 2012). 
 213. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 261. 
 214. See id. at 262. The DEA agents in Mexico City were not allowed to proceed until the search 
was authorized by the Director General of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police (“MFJP”). Id. The 
Director General authorized the search, and the MFJP and DEA carried out the search jointly. Id. 
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Because the Mexican government, and not the United States judiciary, 
possessed the sole capability to authorize the search, there can be no 
constitutional violation—a search is not “unlawful” if the competent 
authority has authorized it.
215
 Second, the absence of a constitutional 
violation does not preclude a court from excluding the evidence at trial.
216
 
That the United States government is limited to its enumerated powers 
cannot be doubted.
217
 Those enumerated powers do not include the ability 
to investigate, arrest, prosecute, and punish any individual anywhere in the 
world without due process of law. If our government is to exert its judicial 
power over non-citizen, non-residents across the globe, it must give those 
defendants the same protections we would expect for our citizens were 
they subjected to the judicial power of another nation.
218
 Once defendants 
are brought within the power of any judicial proceeding of the United 
States, those defendants must be given protections coextensive with those 
of citizens or residents.
219
  
 
 
Verdugo-Urquidez’s complaint was that the DEA agents had failed to obtain a warrant from a U.S. 
court. See id. at 263. 
 215. Id. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). The bulk of Justice Stevens’ one-
paragraph opinion reads:  
I do agree, however, with the Government’s submission that the search conducted by the 
United States agents with the approval and cooperation of the Mexican authorities was not 
“unreasonable” as that term is used in the first Clause of the Amendment. I do not believe the 
Warrant Clause has any application to searches of noncitizens’ homes in foreign jurisdictions 
because American magistrates have no power to authorize such searches. 
Id.; see also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974) (holding that the use of unlawfully 
obtained evidence as the basis of a line of questioning in a grand jury hearing is not entitled to the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule because the questions are merely an extension of the initial 
violation). 
 216. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264 (majority opinion) (“Whether evidence obtained from 
respondents’ Mexican residences should be excluded at trial in the United States is a remedial question 
separate from the existence vel non of the constitutional violation.” (citing United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 906 (1984); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354)). 
 217. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803); see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1957) 
(plurality opinion) (“The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and 
authority have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the 
Constitution.”). 
 218. A notable recent example was the arrest, detention, and trial on espionage charges of three 
American hikers by Iran. See David D. Kirkpatrick, In Rebuke to Iran’s President, Courts Void 
Release of Hikers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2011, at A1. 
 219. Of course, the special situation of a true enemy combatant is the exception that proves the 
rule. International law and Supreme Court precedent require different treatment of enemy combatants. 
See discussion and text accompanying supra notes 146–50. 
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CONCLUSION 
The holding in United States v. Ali,
220
 that due process protections 
categorically do not apply to non-citizen, non-residents, is deeply 
troubling. As was assumed in United States v. Brehm,
221
 if a defendant is 
closely related enough to the United States that he is being subjected to its 
judicial power, that relationship should give rise to constitutional 
protections. The potential impact of Ali extends far beyond its limited 
circumstances. Courts should hesitate before following the flawed 
reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces in order to avoid 
either trampling on the rights of those brought within our power or 
offending other sovereigns. It is only by preserving constitutional 
protections for all criminal defendants that we can preserve United States 
citizenship as both a “high privilege” and a “priceless treasure.”222 
Isaac D. Chaput

 
 
 
 220. 71 M.J. 256 (C.A.A.F. 2012). 
 221. 691 F.3d 547 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 222. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 791 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting). 
  J.D. (2014), Washington University School of Law; B.A. (2010), St. Olaf College. Thank 
you to my colleagues on the Washington University Law Review, in particular Devin Dippold, 
Elizabeth Miller Fitzpatrick, and Amanda Stein, whose excellent editing is greatly appreciated. Thanks 
to Michael Szeto and Brian Thayer for convincing me to look beyond Black’s Law Dictionary for the 
definition of “alien”. Thank you also to the many mentors and friends who have encouraged my 
musings and writing, and to my family for their support in this and every part of my life. 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss5/8
